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Abstract
This paper analyzes a nancing problem for an innovative rm
that is considering launching a web-based platform. Our model is
the rst one that analyzes an entrepreneurs choice between initial
exchange o¤ering (IEO) and initial coin o¤ering (ICO). Compared to
ICO, under IEO the rm is subject to screening by an exchange that
reduces the risk of investment in tokens; also the rm gets access to
a larger set of potential investors; nally tokens become listed on an
exchange faster. We argue that IEO is a better option for the rm
if: 1) the investment size is relatively large; 2) the extent of moral
hazard problems faced by the rm is relatively large; 3) the degree
of investors impatience is relatively small. We aslo nd a non-linear
relationship between rm quality and its nancing choice. Most of
these predictions are new and have not been tested sofar.
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1 Introduction
Financing strategy is a crucial factor of success for innovative businesses (Wil-
son (2015)). It is not surprising that these rms use a variety of di¤erent
strategies to fund their projects including private equity, business incuba-
tors, venture capital nance, angel nance, seed accelerators, crowdfunding
and most recently initial coin o¤erings (ICOs) and initial exchange o¤erings
(IEOs). Usually under ICO, a rm sells utility tokens which give their buyers
(investors) the right to use the companys future products or services. Un-
der IEO, a company sells tokens using the service of organized exchange for
cryptocurrencies such as Binance, LBANK and Coinbene.1 The exchange is
directly involved in the selection of projects, organization and sale of tokens
and becomes the key marketing partner of the project. IEOs had strong
momentum in 2019 with largest Bitnex IEO raising $US1 bln.2
IEO is designed to minimize risks, liquidity problems and a delay in listing
tokens at the end of the token sale. A cryptocurrency exchange distributes
digital assets among interested investors who are users of the trading plat-
form. Compared to ICO, in the case of IEO: 1) the fraud risk for investors is
lower. The project is launched at the exchange after serious verication. The
exchange rejects a suspisous/low quality project to maintain its reputation;
2) listing of new tokens is faster; 3) the investment process is technically
more simple for investors; 4) the marketing costs for the project team are
reduced because the organizers can reach a large number of exchange users;
5) IEO increases the e¤ectiveness of token promotion on the market. At the
same time, all these advantages have some drawbacks. The main one is the
price for the IEO.3
ICO and IEO research is quickly growing. Most papers are focused on
ICOs. Theoretical papers on ICOs include, amomg others, Catalini and
Gans (2018), Li and Mann (2018), Govindan and Wilson (2009), Bakos and
Ha laburda (2018), Cong and Wang (2018), Lee and Parlour (2018), Gar-
ratt and van Oordt (2019) and Miglo (2019, 2020).4 Research on IEOs is
in its early stages and as we are writing this article it includes several em-
pirical papers (eg. Myalo (2019)) but no theoretical paper to the best of
1Myalo (2019).
2ICO and IEO report (2020).
3See Beedham (2019) or Myalo (2019) for more details.
4For empirical research on ICO see, for example, Adhami, Giudici and Martinazzi
(2018), Amsden and Schweizer (2018) and Ante, Sandner and Fiedler (2018).
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our knowledge. Respectively no paper is focused on the choice between ICO
and IEO. For many entrepreneurs this issue seems to be very important.5 In
this article we shed some light on these unexplored questions namely what
are economic ideas behind using IEO compared to ICO and how rms select
between di¤erent types of nancing.
In our model an entrepreneur with an innovative idea considers launching
a web-based platform. In order to nance the development of the platform,
the entrepreneur can use ICO or IEO. There are two types of investors. Type
1 are interested in using tokens to purchase rm products in the future. Type
2 are interested in reselling tokens and creating capital gain. The number
of type 1 investors is crucial because it highlights the market demand for
rm products. We rst consider the case without moral hazard and promot-
ing e¤ects of early listing under IEO. In this case, the choice of nancing
method is irrelevant because both methods lead to the same result for the
rm. The reason is that in either case the number of type 1 investors is cru-
cial and nothing would change it unless other factors/market imperfections
are considered. We then consider our main case when, under IEO, there is
promotional e¤ect of listing. Also under ICO the entrepreneur is subject
to moral hazard problems, ie. he can be involved in an ine¢cient project
("steeling" funds from investors). Our analysis show that IEO will be pref-
fered if the company size is relatively large, the number of type 1 investors
is relatively small and if exchange fees for IEO are relatively low.
Most of our model predictions have not been tested sofar. Interestingly
though, one of our main predictions namely that likelihood of selecting IEO
is positively related to project size seems to be consistent with recent data.
For example Khatib (2019) reports that the average size of IEO is $US17
million while the average size of ICO is $US10 millions. Similar data can be
found in ICO and IEO report (2019).
The model also predicts that companies for which moral hazard problems
is an issue, should prefer IEO. ... I feel that IEO will be the best way
for entrepreneurs to fundraise and take they projects forward. Exchanges
guarantee that due diligence have been done and that someone has checked
the boxes for you. For Memobs blockchain, we decided that the best way
to take forward this revolutionary approach was to have an IEO, Alexandre
Hawari, CEO, Memob, told AMEinfo.6
5See, for example, Khatib (2019).
6Khatib (2019).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic
model and some preliminary results. Section 3 provides an analysis for the
model with moral hazard and other factors. Section 4 analyzes the consis-
tency of the models predictions with observed empirical evidence. Section
5 discusses the models robustness and its potential extensions and Section
6 is a conclusion to the study.
2 The Model Description and Some Prelimi-
naries
An innovative rm has monopoly power over its idea of creating a website
platform for selling a product/service. The initial xed cost of the project is
I.7 The variable cost of production of one unit of the product is c. To nance
the development of the product the rm can use ICO (initial coin o¤ering)
or IEO (initial exchange o¤ering). In both cases, the rm sells utility tokens.
Compared to ICO, under IEO: 1) the rm is screened by an exchange that
reduces the risk of low-quality campaigns including entrepreneurial fraud;8
2) the rm gets access to a larger set of potential investors; 3) tokens become
listed on an exchange faster (see Myalo (2019)). More specically, we model
these di¤erences as follows. There are 3 periods in the model. In period 0,
tokens are sold for the price p0. In period 1 under IEO tokens become listed
and can be sold on an exchange. In period 2 the rm produces products
and tokens can be used to buy products and services o¤ered by the rm
and they can be sold on an exchange under both IEO and ICO. There are
two types of investors. Type 1 are only interested in products o¤ered by
the rm (each investor is interested in consuming one unit of the product).
Total number of type 1 investors is n1. Type 2 are interested in selling
tokens and receiving capital gains. The total number of type 2 investors
is unlimited. After the initial issue of tokens in period 0, token market
participants receive inofrmation about token market future prospects. After
that a fraction  of randomly chosen type 2 investors who purchased tokens
during IEO will sell them in period 1 and the remaining type 2 investors will
sell their tokens in period 2.  is related to token market uncertainty. It is well
7In Section 5 we discuss the models assumptions.
8A lot of campaigns fail or turn out to be low quality or even fraud in some cases. See,
for example, Cumming, Johan and Pant (2019), OECD (2019).
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known from the literature that the degree of this uncertainty is very high (see
eg Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou and Gabauer (2019) or Financial Stability
Board (2018)). In addition to factors a¤ecting the markets for traditional
nancial assets, token market is also a¤ected by factors a¤ecting blockchain
technology development, cryptocurrencies (since payments can be made in
cryptotokens) etc. High  is associated with token market uncertainty and
investors impatience, while low  means that token market anticipations
are rather positive and investors are patient. The consumption value of
tokens is v. All investors are risk-neutral and risk-free interest rate is 0.
So investors purchase tokens if the expected payo¤ covers investment cost.
Also, the entrepreneur is subject to moral hazard. Under ICO, after funds are
collected, the entrepreneur can be involved in some ine¢cient project instead
of continuing with production. More specically we assume that in the case
of success this "ine¢cient" project brings an amount of prot equal to the
amount of funds collected during ICO and in the case of failure it gives the
entrepreneur zero. The probability of success is . An interpretation is that
funds are stolen and 1   is the probability of being caught. Finally, under
IEO, the rm pays a fee F to the exchange. Also information about all issues
of tokens is imperfect. More speccally we assume that since under IEO more
investors are potentially reached than under ICO and also because under IEO
the tokens are listed on an exchange faster, IEO has a promotional e¤ect i.e
under IEO some investors get information about new rm and its tokens even
though they did not have it otherwise. In the model, an additional number
X of type 1 investors are created in case of IEO in period 2. Finally if the
number of tokens is smaller than the total number of potential investors when
the rm sells tokens in period 0 we assume that type 1 investors will buy
rst in case of ICO and type 2 investors will buy rst in case of IEO.9
Let n be the total number of tokens issued and nj be the number of type
j investors, j = 1; 2.
n1  n1
n = n1 + n2
The value of issued tokens should cover the investment cost and production
9This assumption is not crucial for our paper result qualitatively and is consistent with
the spirit of di¤erent types of nancing. ICO is more closed compared to IEO so ICO is less
attractive for type 2 investors compared to type 1 investors while IEO is more attractive
for them. More discussion is provided in Section 5.
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cost:
np0  I + cn (1)
First consider perfect information scenarios without moral hazard prob-
lems and other market imperfections eg. exchange fees, i.e. X = 0, F = 0
and  = 1.
2.1 ICO
The timing of events is present in Figure 1.
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firm sells tokens
to investors
p0 is determined
Investment I
is made
The platform is
launched
The rm produces
n items of the product
Tokens are traded on an
exchange for the price p2
Tokens are exchanged for products
Figure 1. The sequence of events for ICO.
First note that with probability  the return for type 2 investors partici-
pating in an ICO is zero because they will not be able to sell tokens in period
1 (tokens will not be listed in case of ICO until period 2).
Equilibrium in token market in period 2 depends on the total number of
token buyers and sellers. If the number of token buyers is equal or greater
than the number of token sellers, equilibrium price is v (see Figure 2a).
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Figure 2. Token market equilibrium (E). Bold line: token supply;
doted line-token demand. a) the number of token buyers is equal
or greater than the number of token sellers; b) the number of
token buyers is smaller than the number of token sellers.
Otherwise the price is 0 (see Figure 2b). Indeed in the latter case if the
price is greater than zero, it can not be an equilibrium because any of sellers
who did not sell his tokens could o¤er a slightly lower price.
In our case the number of token sellers in period 2 is n2(1   ) and the
number of buyers equals n1   n1. So if
n1   n1  n2(1  ) (2)
then p2 = v. Otherwise p2 = 0. In fact, (2) always holds. Indeed if it does
not and p2 = 0, type 2 investors will not be interested in purchasing tokens
and n2 = 0 implying that (2) holds.
Also one should have:
p0  v
The rm selects p0 and n to maximize its prot:
 = np0   I   cn
The solution is as follows. If v  I=n1 + c, optimal n = 0. Otherwise two
strategies are possible. First is
p0 = v
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In this case type 2 investors are not interested to buy tokens during ICO
because their expected payo¤ ((1  )v) is less than p0. It implies
n = n1
 = n1v   I   cn1 (3)
Second is
p0 = (1  )v
Eventhough type 2 investors are interested in purchasing tokens during ICO,
the total number of issued tokens can not exceed n1 becasue type 2 investors
will still resell their tokens to type 1 investors and since one consumer is only
interested in consuming one good, the total number of produced goods can
not be larger than n1.
n = n1
 = n1v(1  )  I   cn1 (4)
First strategy is optimal.
2.2 IEO
The timing of events is present in Figure 3.
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firm sells tokens
to investors
p0 is determined
Investment I
is made
The platform is
launched
Tokens are traded
on an exchange
for the price p1
The rm produces
n items of the product
Tokens are traded on an
exchange for the price p2
Tokens are exchanged for products
Figure 3. The sequence of events for IEO.
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Consider token market equilibrium in period 1. The number of token
sellers in period 1 is n2 and the number of buyers equals n1   n1. So if
n1   n1  n2 (5)
then p1 = v. Otherwise p1 = 0. Suppose (5) holds. In this case n11 = n2
(n11 is the number of type 1 investors who purchased tokens in period 1).
Consider token market equilibrium in period 2. The number of token
sellers in period 2 is n2(1 ) and the number of buyers equals n1 n1 n2.
So if
n1   n1   n2  n2(1  )
or
n1  n1 + n2 (6)
then p2 = v. Otherwise p2 = 0. Two cases are possible.
1. Suppose that condition (6) holds. The rm maximizes its prot:
 = np0   I   cn
The solution is as follows. If v  I=n1 + c, optimal n = 0. The project is
worthless. Otherwise the solution is
p0 = v
n = n1
 = n1v   I   cn1 (7)
2. Suppose that (6) does not hold. Then
n1 < n1 + n2 (8)
and p2 = 0. Also
p0  v
Otherwise no investor is interested in purchasing tokens. The solution is as
follows. If v  I=n1 + c, optimal n = 0 and q = 0. The project is worthless.
Otherwise two strategies are possible. First is p0 = v. In this case type 2
investors are not interested to buy tokens during ICO because their expected
9
payo¤ (v) is less than p0 that contradicts (8). But this contradicys our
assumption that (6) does not hold. Another strategy is10
p0 = v
Even though type 2 investors are interested in purchasing tokens during ICO,
the total number of issued tokens can not exceed n1 becasue type 2 investors
will still resell their tokens to type 1 investors and since one consumer is only
interested in consuming one good, the total number of produced goods can
not be larger than n1.
n = n1
 = vn1   I   cn1
First strategy is optimal.
Now suppose (5) does not hold. In this case n11 = n1   n1.
Consider token market equilibrium in period 2. The number of token
sellers in period 2 is n2(1  ) and the number of buyers equals 0. So p2 = 0.
No type 2 investors will buy tokens initially since their payo¤ is 0. But this
contradicts that (5) does not hold.
Lemma 1. Without moral hazard and absence of promoting e¤ect of
listing, there are two cases: 1) if v  I=n1 + c, the project is worthless for
the entrepreneur; 2) otherwise the rm is indi¤erent between ICO and IEO.
Proof. Follows from the analysis of (3) and (7).
This result is not surprising given that in the absence of any nancial
market imperfections every type of nancing should have the same result
(similar to Modigliani-Miller proposition (1958)).
3 Moral hazard and promoting e¤ect of early
listing
In this section we analyze the role of moral hazard, promotional e¤ect of
IEO and other factors on the rms choice of nancing strategy. Di¤erent
strategies attract di¤erent types of investors. Also the rm choice a¤ects the
incentives of the entrepreneur.
10Any price below v but higher than v makes no sense for the rm because it reduces
rm prot without attracting new token buyers.
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3.1 ICO
The timing of events for ICO is present in Figure 4.
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firm sells tokens
to investors
p0 is determined
The entrepreneur
decides whether
to stay or to quit
If he stays,
investment I
is made
The platform
is launched
The rm produces
n items of the product
Tokens are traded on an
exchange for the price p2
Tokens are exchanged for products
Figure 4. The sequence of events for ICO.
Di¤erence with previous case is that now we should consider the entre-
preneurs decision whether to "steel" money from the rm.
If p0 = v and the entrepreneur continues, his payo¤ equals n1v   I   cn1
according to (3). If he withdraws funds then it is (1  )n1v. If
 >
I + cn1
n1v
(9)
then he continues. Note that RHS (right-hand side) of (9) is less than 1
because of (1).
Funders rationally anticipate opportunity for steeling and will not provide
funds if condition (9) does not hold.
Note that lowering ICO token price does not increase rm credibility in
the eyes of investors. Indeed suppose p0 = v(1   ). If the entrepreneur
continues, his payo¤ equals n1v(1   )   I   cn1 according to (4). If he
withdraws funds then it is (1  )n1v(1  ). If
 >
I + cn1
n1v(1  )
(10)
then he continues. RHS of (10) is greater than RHS of (9) so if (10) does not
hold (i.e. the entrepreneur steels money when the price equals v), (10) does
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hold too and the entrepreneur steels money even if the price is lower. This
leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If  > I+cn1
n1v
, n = n1 and  = n1v   I   cn1. If
 < I+cn1
n1v
, ICO is not feasible.
Proof. Follows from above.
3.2 IEO
The timing of events for IEO is present in Figure 5.
-t = 0 t = 1 t = 2s s s
Firm sells tokens
to investors
p0 is determined
Investment I
is made
The platform is
launched
Tokens are traded
on an exchange
for the price p1
The rm produces
n items of the product
A number X
of type 1 investors
enters the market
Tokens are traded on an
exchange for the price p2
Tokens are exchanged for products
Figure 5. The sequence of events with moral hazard for IEO.
The cost of the project does now include an exchange fee F that implies:
np0  I + cn+ F
The rm maximizes its prot:
 = np0   I   cn  F (11)
The number of sellers in period 1 is n2 and the number of buyers equals
n1   n1. Two cases are possible.
If
n1   n1  n2 (12)
then p1 = v. The number of sellers in period 2 is (1 )n2 and the number of
buyers equals n1 n1 n12+X, where n12 is the number of type 1 investors
12
who purchased tokens in period 1 from type 2 investors. Since (12) holds,
n12 = n2. So if
n1   n1   n2 +X  (1  )n2 (13)
or
n1 +X  n1 + n2
then p2 = v. Otherwise p2 = 0.
If
n1   n1 < n2 (14)
then p1 = 0. The number of sellers in period 2 is (1 )n2 and the number of
buyers equals n1 n1 n12+X, where n12 is the number of type 1 investors
who purchased tokens in period 1 from type 2 investors. Since (12) does not
hold, n12 = n1   n1. So the number of buyers in period 2 is X. If
X  (1  )n2 (15)
then p2 = v. Otherwise p2 = 0. In the latter case type 2 investors are
not interested in purchasing tokens during IEO, i.e. n2 = 0 leading to a
contradiction with (14). So if (14) holds, (15) should hold too.
Suppose (12) holds. Two situations are possible.
1) (13) holds. When both constraints hold, p0 = v as was noted previ-
ously, and, as follows from (11), the solution for the rm is to nd maximal n
such that both constraints (12) and (13) hold. Type 2 investors are interested
in buying tokens during IEO because both constraints hold, p1 = p2 = v,
the expected payo¤ to type 2 investor equals v and it covers the investment
cost. It implies that no type 1 investor will be able to buy a token in period
0: n1 = 0. Condition (12) becomes
n1  n (16)
and condition (13) becomes
n1 +X  n (17)
Two cases are possible
If
n1 +X 
n1

13
the maximal n that satisfy both (16) and (17) is
n = n1=
If
n1 +X <
n1

the solution is
n = n1 +X
2) (13) does not hold. Two strategies are possible for the rm. First
p0 = v. In this case type 2 investors will not buy tokens. This leads to
a contradiction that (13) does not hold. Another strategy is p0 = v. If
n1 + X 
n1

, no n exists that simultaneously satises (16) and does not
satisfy (17). If n1 + X <
n1

the maximal n that satisfy (16) and does not
satisfy (17) is
n = n1=
Now suppose (12) does not hold. If (13) does not hold, then p2 = 0. In
this case no type 2 investor would buy tokens leading to a contradiction that
(12) does not hold. So (13) holds. Two strategies are possible for the rm.
First p0 = v. In this case type 2 investors will not buy tokens. This leads to
a contradiction that (12) does not hold. Another strategy is p0 = (1   )v.
Since type 2 investors are interested in buying tokens, type 1 investors will
be able to purchase tokens during IEO: n1 = 0. Condition (12) becomes
n1  n and condition (15) becomes X  (1  )n2. Two cases are possible.
If n1 +X 
n1

, the solution is
n =
X
1  
If n1 +X <
n1

, no solution exists.
Proposition 2. 1) If X < n1(1 )

, n = n1 + X and  = (n1 + X)v  
I   c(n1 +X)  F . 2) If X >
n1(1 )

then if
(1  )(v   c)
((1  )v   c)

X
n1
(18)
n = n1= and  = vn1=   I   cn1=   F . Otheriwse n = X=(1  ) and
 = Xv   I   cX=(1  )  F .
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Proof. Consider X < n1(1 )

. Two strategies are possible. if p0 = v then
n = n1+X and  = (n1+X)v I c(n1+X) F . If p0 = v then n = n1=
and  = n1v   I   cn1=   F which is smaller than previous result.
Consider X > n1(1 )

. Two strategies are possible. if p0 = v then n =
n1= and  = vn1=   I   cn1=   F . if p = (1   )v then n =
X
1 
and
 = Xv  I   c X
1 
 F . Comparing these two results leads to the following.
If (1 )(v c)
((1 )v c)
 X
n1
then the former is greater and vice versa.
The interpretation of these results is as follows. If X is low, the rm will
be able to sell tokens equal to the number of all type 1 investors (existing ones
(n1) and expected ones in the future (X)). When X increases, a rm is not
always able to sell an increasing number of tokens in period 0 in anticipation
of future high demand from type 1 investors because of risk that too many
tokens will be o¤ered for sale in period 1 or 2 leading to low market price
of token. In order to keep the incentive of type 2 investors to particpate in
token issue the rm would then need to consider opportunities for lowering
the initial price of tokens. So di¤erent scenarios are possible. For example,
if the number of existing type 1 investors is relatively high (condition (18))
compared to expected future demand, the rm would prefer to keep the issue
price high while otherwise it may consider lowering the issue price.
Now we compare ICO and IEO.
Proposition 3. 1) If  < I+cn1
n1v
, IEO is preferred. (ICO is not feasible);
2) If  > I+cn1
n1v
then: if X < n1(1 )

, IEO is preferred if X(v   c) > F .
If X > n1(1 )

and (1 )(v c)
((1 )v c)
 X
n1
, IEO is preferred. If X > n1(1 )

and
(1 )(v c)
((1 )v c)
< X
n1
, IEO is preferred if v(X   n1)  c(
X
1 
  n1) > F .
Proof. Two cases are possible.
1. If
 <
I + cn1
n1v
(19)
IEO is preferred (ICO is not feasible according to Proposition 1).
2. I+cn1
n1v
< . if X < n1(1 )

then if IEO: n = n1 + X and  =
(n1 + X)v   I   c(n1 + X)   F . If ICO then  = n1v   I   cn1. IEO is
preferred if
X(v   c) > F (20)
If X > n1(1 )

and v c
v c=(1 )
 X
n1
, then if IEO: n = n1= and  =
vn1=   I   cn1=   F . If ICO then  = n1v   I   cn1. IEO is preferred.
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If X > n1(1 )

and v c
v c=(1 )
< X
n1
, then if IEO: n = X=(1   ) and
 = Xv   I   cX=(1   )   F . If ICO then  = n1v   I   cn1. IEO is
preferred if
v(X   n1)  c(
X
1  
  n1) > F (21)
4 Implications
Our paper has several implications for an entrepreneurial rms choice of
nancing strategy.
Proposition 3 implies that IEO is preferred to ICO if the investment
cost of the project increases. Indeed, (19) is more likely to hold when I
increases and vice versa. If (19) holds, then ICO is not feasible and IEO
is the dominant choice for entrepreneurs. Although this prediction has not
been tested directly it is consistent with the spirit of, for example, Khatib
(2019). The author nds that the average size of IEO is $US17 million while
the average size of ICO is $US10 millions. Similar data can be found in ICO
and IEO report (2019).
Proposition 3 also implies that the likelihood of IEO is negatively related
to . Indeed the derivative of LHS of (21) equals   cX
(1 )2
< 0. It means
that IEO is better than ICO when the token market participants do not
anticipate long-term problems and/or short-term speculation (high volume
of token sales in the short run). In the case of IEO it is better to put this
kind of pressure on later periods when the promotional e¤ect of IEO will have
an impact on a number of potential token buyers and the market pressure
coming from token sale by type 2 investors is mitigated.
Also the model predicts that under IEO one can have a situation when
the price of tokens increases by more than under ICO but not an opposite
scenario. Indeed if (21) holds then under IEO p0 = (1 )v and p2 = v which
means that under IEO the extent of underpricing (low token issue price) is
larger than under ICO but on the other hand a long-term return on tokens
is higher.
Finally the model predicts that the likelihood of IEO is negatively related
to the size of exchange fees (F ) and the probability of "ine¢cient project"
() success and positively related to the expected increase in the demand
from type 1 of investors due to promotional e¤ect of early listing (X).
Also the model predicts a non-linear relationship between product quality
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(v) and rm choice. First when v is too low condition (9) will not hold
implying that IEO will be selected. When v increases and (9) holds then
based on conditions (20) and (21), ICO can be preferred if v is not too
high ("intermediate range") and vice versa. So when v is very large, IEO is
preferred choice again.
5 The Model Extensions And Robustness
Other types of moral hazard. In our model, the moral hazard takes place
because the production process is costly for the entrepreneur and he will
fully bear this cost while the expected reward in case of quitting may be
higher if  is su¢ciently low. To some extent this approach is similar to the
asset substituion e¤ect in nancing literature when entrepreneur switches to
a socially ine¢cient project when he is not going to fully enjoy the benets
of socially e¢cient project because of payo¤ structure (Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976)). There are many di¤erent ways to analyze moral hazard issues,
for example, to explicitely assume that the entrepreneurs can issue security
token11 in additon to utility tokens and then assume that his e¤ort can be
socially ine¢cient because of agency cost of equity. One can also include the
cryptocurrency exchange moral hazard problem when conducting a project
expertise etc. At this point, however, we do not see which parts of our model
results can be a¤ected qualitatively without signicantly complicating the
models solutions so we leave it for future research.
Mixed nancing and more types of nancing. Unlike capital structure lit-
erature, where a debt/equity mix is a very common strategy (as opposed to
pure equity or pure debt nancing),12 simultaneously using ICO and IEO has
not shown to be common so we dont consider it in the model. One can aslo in-
clude other types of tokens (such as mentioned previously security tokens) or
other types of nancing (such as bank loans or venture capital). There exists
a large spectrum of opportunities here and future evidence would demon-
strate which cases are really important for entrepreneurs and which ones
deserve to be investigated further. At this point we can see that the choice
11See, for example, Adhami, Giudici and Martinazzi (2017), Ante and Fiedler (2019)
and Miglo (2019).
12For a review of capital structure literature see, among others, Harris and Raviv (1991)
or Miglo (2011). For a traditional analysis of the capital structure of internet companies
see, for example, Miglo, Lee and Liang (2014).
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between ICO and IEO is a real issue for many innovative entrepreneurs13 so
we focus on this case.
Two stages. One can assume that the rm issues tokens in two stages.
As far as we can see, the results will not change with the introduction of this
assumption however if one introduces for example two development periods
in the model with two di¤erent stages of investment in each period the results
will change at least quantitatively. It is hard to predict the consequences of
such a change so it is di¢cult to judge if it is a promising avenue for future
research.
Di¤erent priority rules. In the model we assumed that when the number
of tokens is smaller when the number of investors then under ICO type 1
investors will buy rst and under IEO type 2 investors will buy rst. As
we mentioned, this assumption is not important qualitatively for the model
results. One can further extend the model by assuming, for example, that
under IEO a fraction  of tokens is purchased by type 1 investors and rep-
sectively 1    by type 1 investors. 1    is related to the overall level of
market investors reach by an exchange. Our analysis shows that no result
of our analysis changes qualitatively althouhg some formulas would change.
For example, condition (21) becomes v( X
1 
  n1)   c(
X
(1 )(1 )
  n1) > F .
If it holds, the rm would prefer IEO and vice versa. All predictions remain
the same with an addition of a new prediction about the role of changes in
. The derivative of LHS in  of this condition equals v(1   )   c. If 
is relatively small, it is positive and higher a improves the attractiveness of
IEO and vice versa.
Asymmetric information. In our paper we focus on ex-post asymmetric
information, i.e an environment where the outcome of a nancing strategy
depends on the incentives of the entrepreneur. One can consider a model
with ex-ante asymmetric information where the entrepreneur initially has
some signals about its platform and would like to signal it to the market via
tokens issue. It is an interesting avenue for future analysis but it is beyond
the scope of our model.
6 Conclusions
This article is the rst one that o¤ers a model of the choice between ICO and
IEO for an innovative rm looking to fund the development of its platform.
13See, for example, Khatib (2019).
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Existing literature usually focuses on ICOs. Our paper is also the rst one
that has a theoretical model of IEO. The topic is a highly growing area among
researchers and practioners. Our model is based on some important features
of IEO. As compared to ICO, under IEO the rm is subject to screening
by a cryptocurrency exchange; also the rm gets access to a larger set of
potential investors; nally tokens become listed on an exchange faster. We
argue that IEO is a better option for the rm if: 1) the investment size is
relatively large; 2) the extent of moral hazard problems faced by the rm
is relatively large; 3) the token market prospects are relatively positive and
the degree of investors impatience is relatively small. We also nd a non-
linear relationship between rm quality and its nancing choice. Most of our
models predictions are new and have not yet been tested but they seem to
be consistent to some extent with some recent publications on IEO.14
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